This paper looks at different rules in dissolving a common value partnership when one partner holds proprietary information. In winner's bid auction (WBA) and loser's bid auction (LBA), there exists unique mixed strategy equilibrium.
Introduction
By partnership, we refer to some indivisible asset jointly owned by more than one partners. In many situations, the partners may not want to own the asset together, hence triggering a dissolution of the partnership. As the rules governing the division of the asset are typically either legislated or negotiated using lawyers and the courts, who are poorly informed about the value of the asset, it is important to study simple price-generating mechanisms that do not depend on such information. Most commonly used mechanisms are winner's bid auction (WBA), loser's bid auction (LBA), and cake-cutting mechanisms (CCM). 1 WBA and LBA are variants of first price and second price auctions with the special feature that losers of the auctions receive part of the auction revenue. In both WBA and LBA, the partners submit sealed bids, and the asset is transferred to the highest bidder.
In WBA, the highest bid makes the final bid, while in LBA, the lower bid makes the final transaction price. WBA and LBA are the relevant mechanisms whenever auctions are used to dissolve a partnership (or a joint venture or a marriage) or when they are used to settle the competition between raider firms seeking to take over a target firm.
In CCM, one partner proposes a price for the whole asset, and the other one has the option of buying the first partner out at the proposed price or sells his own shares to the first partner at that price. This is also a mechanism widely used in practice and recommended by legal advisors. 2 This paper considers a common-value partnership that is initially jointly owned by two partners but is to be dissolved. One partner receives a private signal about the value of the asset while the other partner holds only public information. We analyse in turn bidders' equilibrium strategies and expected payoffs under the three dissolution rules and compare their performance on the basis of information rent and information acquisition incentives they generate for the partners. 3 The main findings are as follows. First, unique equilibrium of WBA and LBA is in mixed strategies. Uninformed partner randomizes his bids as if he has received some private signal drawn from the same distribution as that of the informed partner. Second, "payoff equivalence" between WBA and LBA are established in the sense that partners obtain the same expected payoffs under the two auction formats. The informed partner expects an information rent while the uninformed suffers from a loss which can be described as an "ownership's curse". Third, in CCM, if the uninformed partner is the proposer, the informed partner receives an information rent. If the informed partner is the proposer, CCM makes a perfect mechanism as its unique mixed strategy equilibrium shares the asset value equally between the two partners. Finally, if information acquisition is an endogenous process and occurs after dissolution is determined (and the role in CCM is assigned), all the three institutions lead to socially wasteful information acquisition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first outline related literature and the setup of the model. In sections 3, 4, and 5, we analyze the equilibrium and compute the partners' expected payoffs if the dissolutions rules are respectively WBA, LBA and CCM. In section 6, we rank the three institutions on the basis of information rent they generate to the informed partner and examine the efficiency loss if information acquisition is endogenous. Section 7 concludes. All the proofs not in the text are relegated to the appendix. Fieseler, Kittsteiner, and Moldovanu (2003) , Kittsteiner (2003) , Jehiel and Pauzner (2006) allowed for the possibility of interdependent private values. The focus of these papers is whether the asset can be allocated to the partner that values it most 4 while the current paper looks at the information rent arising from proprietary information under different institutions and the impact on efficiency when information acquisition is endogenous.
The paper is closely related to the study of fair division games. (See Gueth and van Damme (1986) , etc.) Latest contribution in this literature is Morgan (2004) who compares fairness of different dissolution rules in a two-sided incomplete information framework. In his framework, all the three institutions are ex ante fair. The current paper shows that under one-sided proprietary information, "fair" rules may either lose their fairness, or lead to socially wasteful information acquisition activities when the partners compete in information acquisition. 5
Finally, the paper is related to the contributions on competitive bidding with proprietary information, eg. Wilson (1967) , Milgrom and Weber (1982) , and Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983) . One prominent result in those papers is that the uninformed bidders expect zero payoff. However, when the bidders are also owners of the asset and share the auction revenues even when they are losers, the uninformed partner expects a loss in comparison with his status quo. 6 4 One must bear in mind the limit of the efficiency concept in those papers. Efficiency means that conditional on dissolution the partner who values the asset most shall obtain the asset. For a more complete consideration of the efficiency problem, refer to Li and Wolfstetter (2007) . 5 Schweinzer (2008) considers a repeated bargaining game in a similar framework to the current paper. In that game, the informed partner by proposing a price signals to the other partner his private information. The private information is revealed gradually as the bargain goes on and the informed partner always gets an informational rent. 6 He would however suffer from a even bigger loss if the partnership is not dissolved. Therefore, the uninformed partner is "held up" if the partnership is dissolved using WBA, LBA, or CCM if he is assigned the role of proposer. 
The Setup

The Winner's Bid Auction
In a winner's bid auction, the two partners simultaneously submit a price for the asset.
The partner with highest price wins the auction, receives the asset and pays half of his own bid to the other partner. Ties are resolved by the flip of a coin. 
For marginal
Therefore, (2) is strictly larger than (1). Partner B has an incentive to bid s + 2 rather than s, destroying the optimality s. Therefore, there is no equilibrium that partner B plays pure strategy.
Denote partner A's strategy by β(·). Such strategy must be a mapping from his private signal X into real positive numbers. Partner B's randomization strategy can be described by a distribution G(·) over his choice of actions on [0,x].
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, partner A's strategy β(X) is continuous and strictly increasing in X, with β(0) = 0 and β(x) :=b <x. Partner B chooses his bid s at random from the interval [0,b] . The distribution of s, G(s), is atomless.
Since partner B uses the atomless strategy G(s) on [0,b], we can use g(s) to denote the associated density. Since partner A's bidding strategy is continuous and monotone, we can denote the signal that leads to a bid b as β −1 (b).
Given partner B's strategy G(s), and partner A's signal x, partner A chooses his bid b by solving the following maximization problem:
Partner A wins the auction with probability G(b) when he places bid b. If he wins, he gets the asset which values x to him and pays partner B a half of his bid b. When his bid is below partner B's bid, he is the loser. Partner B receives the asset and partner A receives a half of partner B's bid as compensation. As partner B randomizes according to G(·), partner A's equilibrium strategy would be such that it is indeed optimal for partner B to randomize according to G(·).
Taking the derivative of (3) with respect to b and setting it equal to zero yields the first order condition:
For partner B, given partner A's strategy β(x), G(·) should be such that any equilibrium action s equally maximizes his expected payoff:
When bidding s, partner B expects to win the auction if and only if β(X) ≤ s, or equivalently X ≤ β −1 (s). Therefore, partner B wins the auction with probability F (β −1 (s)). When he wins, he receives the asset which generates an expected value E[X | X < β −1 (s)] to him, and pays half of his bid s to partner A. When he loses, he sells his share to partner A and receives a half of partner A's bid as compensation.
As partner B plays mixed strategy, any action from his equilibrium strategy space shall bring him the same expected payoff in equilibrium. Therefore, partner A's equilibrium bid b shall be such that the derivative of U B (s) with respect to s is equal to 0.
Since any s ∈ [0,b] satisfies (6), s = β(x) satisfies (6) as well. Using s = β(x) and rewriting (6) give us:
Equilibrium of the game is described by a pair (β(·), G(·)) that solves simultaneously the differential equations (4) and (7).
Proposition 1. The winner's bid auction has a unique equilibrium (β(x), G(s)) where:
Proof. The plan is to show that β(·) and G(·) are mutually best responses. Given partner B's randomization strategy G(·), if partner A with signal x bids an amount β(x ), his payoff is:
Its derivative with respect to x is:
From B's strategy, we have:
Applying (12) to (11), we get:
Using (8), one gets:
The best choice for partner A is x = x. This confirms that β(x) is indeed partner A's best response to the proposed strategy of partner B.
We still need to show that given β(X), any bid of partner B from his action space leads to the same expected payoff. From Lemma (2), we learned that the support of the two partners' strategy is the same, ie [0,b]. Therefore, for any partner B's bid s ∈ [0,b], one can find a value x such that s = β(x ), or equivalently, β −1 (s) = x . Therefore, one can rewrite partner B's expected payoff (5) as a function of x as follows:
maximized. If a random bid s from [0,b] leads to the same expected payoff for partner B, then the associated x from interval [0,x] must also lead to the same result. Taking the derivative of U B (x ) with respect to x , we get:
The uniqueness of the equilibrium can be easily shown using the arguments in Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983) and Dubra (2006) .
Some features of Proposition 1 is noteworthy. First, the equilibrium bidding strategy of the informed bidder, β, is the same as that in a winner's bid auction with private values symmetrically and independently distributed according to F . 7 Although partner B has no private information concerning the value of the asset, his equilibrium randomization strategy, G(·), is such that the distribution of competing bid that partner A faces is the same as if he were confronting a bidder with private values that are independently distributed, also according to F . In the next proposition, we characterize the two partners' expected payoff.
Proposition 2. The two partners' expected payoffs are respectively:
Proof. Denote partner A's equilibrium payoff when he has received signal x as U A (x).
Using (3), we get
yg(y)dy 7 See Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2005) for the derivation of equilibrium strategies under symmetric independent private values' framework.
Using
partner A's equilibrium payoff can be transformed into:
Applying integration by parts respectively to the third and last term, one obtains:
Therefore, partner A's expected payoff is:
Ex ante, the expected value of the firm is:
Therefore, partner A's expected payoff can be written as
Since the bid distributions of A and B have identical supports, there must be some x such that s = β(x). Therefore, partner B's maximization problem can be solved by
choosing an x such that the following is maximized:
Applying integration by parts to the first, the fourth and the last term, one gets:
Since U B (x) is indeed independent of x, this confirms that partner B indeed plays mixed strategy according to G(·) in equilibrium.
A striking feature of Proposition 2 is that the uninformed partner expects to be worse off than his status quo, ownership of half of the asset value. Due to his ownership of the asset, the uninformed partner is entitled to half of the winning bid to exchange for his share of the asset. If the partnership is not dissolved, the value of his shares diminishes quickly. This gives the informed partner an opportunity to hold up the uninformed partner if WBA is used to dissolve the partnership. The uninformed partner thus experiences an "ownership's curse", which does not exist in standard auctions where no share of the auction revenue goes to the loser and the uninformed partner can assure himself of no loss by placing a zero bid.
Corollary 1. Ex ante partner A's expected payoff is larger than a half of the expected asset value. Partner B's expected payoff is smaller than a half of the expected asset value.
Partner A obtains an information rent
Example 1. Suppose X is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. In a winner's bid auction, the two partners' equilibrium strategies are respectively β(x) = 2 3 x and G(s) = 3 2 s. The intervals of serious bids are identically given by [0, 2 3 ]. Partner A's equilibrium payoff is equal to 1 3 . Partner 2's expected payoff is equal to 1 6 . The information rent of partner A is equal to 1 6 .
The Loser's Bid Auction
In a loser's bid auction, the bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and pays half of the lower bid to the other partner. Ties are again resolved by the flip of a coin.
In analogy to the winner's bid auction, the only equilibrium that exists is in mixed strategy. Partner A plays a continuous monotone increasing pure strategy β :
Partner B plays mixed strategy by randomizing his bid according to an atomless distribution function G(·) over the range [b,x] .
Given partner B's equilibrium strategy G(·), partner A chooses bid b to maximize the following expected payoff:
When partner A places a bid b, he wins the auction with probability G(b). When he wins, he receives the entire asset which worths x to him and pays a half of partner B's bid. Since partner B's bid is a random variable to him, partner A conditions his expected payoffs on the fact that partner B has placed a lower bid than himself. When he loses the auction, partner A receives a half of his own bid as an exchange for his share of the asset. The first order condition is:
Therefore, partner B's strategy G(·) is determined by
Given partner A's strategy β(x), partner B chooses bid s to maximize:
When placing a bid s, partner B wins the auction if β(X) ≤ s, or equivalently X ≤ β −1 (s). This happens with probability F (β −1 (s)). When he wins, partner B receives the asset, updates his expectation of the asset value to E[X | X ≤ β −1 (s)] conditional on the fact that he has won, and pays half of partner A's bid
Partner B loses with probability 1 − F (β −1 (s)). If he loses, he gives up his own share of the asset and receives a half of his own bid s as a compensation. As partner B plays mixed strategy in equilibrium, any choice of action s leads to the same expected payoff.
Therefore, the derivative of U B (s) with respect to s must be equal to 0.
Since the two partners' action spaces are identical, for any s in partner B's strategy space, there must exist an s such that β −1 (s) = x. Equation (18) can be transformed into:
Rearranging terms, we get:
The solutions to the two simultaneous differential equations (16) and (19) define the equilibrium strategies of the two partners.
Proposition 3. The loser's bid auction has a unique equilibrium (β(x), G(s)) where:
Its derivative with respect to x brings us
Using partner B's strategy, we get 
Its derivative with respect to x is
This confirms that G(s) is indeed partner B's best response to partner A's strategy β(·).
From Proposition 3, we learn that in an LBA, the uninformed partner bids as if he has drawn a private signal according to the same distribution F (·), as that of the informed partners.
In the next proposition, we derive the expected payoffs of the two partners.
Proposition 4. The two partners' expected payoffs are given by:
Proof. Conditional on his signal x, partner A's payoff from LBA when both partners play the equilibrium strategies is:
Using G(β(x)) = F (x) and g(β(x))· dβ(x) dx = f (x), the above objective can be transformed into:
Using 20, we obtain
Rearranging terms, we get
Applying integration by parts to the last term, we get
Therefore, ex ante partner A's expected payoff is:
Making use of
we can rewrite partner A's ex ante expected payoff as
As partner B randomizes on the range [b,x] , his expected payoff can be derived easily when he chooses action b =x and wins with probability 1. His expected payoff in that case is
Substituting β(x) using (20), we get
Applying integration by parts to the last term, we obtain
When we compare the results of Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, we see that the partners' payoffs from the two different auction formats do not differ. In Proposition 1
and Proposition 3 we established that when information is asymmetric, the uninformed partner plays a mixed strategy as if he has drawn an independent signal from the same distribution as that of the informed partner. Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2005) proved the "payoff equivalence" of the WBA and LBA in symmetric independent private value's framework. It is therefore a straightforward extension that the expected payoffs of the partners in the current asymmetric common value framework are also equivalent under the two auction formats. This is a striking feature of the information structure and can be understood as a variant of the "revenue equivalence" of standard first and second price auctions in symmetric independent private values' framework.
Corollary 2. WBA and LBA are "payoff" equivalent.
We close this section with a numerical example on LBA, assuming that random variable X is uniformly distributed.
Example 2. Suppose X is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. In a loser's bid auction, partner A's equilibrium strategy is β(x) = 2 3 x + 1 3 , and G(s) = 3s 2 − 1 2 . The intervals of serious bids are identically given by [ 1 3 , 1]. Partner A's equilibrium payoff is equal to 1 3 . Partner 2's expected payoff in this case is equal to 1 6 . The information rent of partner A is equal to 1 6 .
The Cake-Cutting Mechanism
The cake-cutting mechanism specifies that one partner must propose a price p for the entire asset. The other partner has the option whether to buy out the proposer and pays Proof. Given any price p, partner A only buys if the payoff from buying is bigger than that from selling. That is the case if x − 1 2 p ≥ 1 2 p, resulting in x ≥ p. Given partner A's strategy, partner B chooses price p to maximize his expected payoff
The unique price p is determined by the first order condition that can be written as
Therefore, the optimal price for partner B is X m , the median of random variable X.
Thus, when partner B is the proposer, partner A becomes single owner of the asset if x ≥ x m and partner B becomes single owner otherwise.
Proposition 6. In CCM, if the uninformed partner, partner B, is the proposer, the two partners' expected payoffs are:
Proof. Partner B's payoff is obtained by substituting X = x m into equation (24). Since partner A becomes the single owner if and only if x ≥ x m , his payoff is equal to x − 1 2 x m if x ≥ x m and equal to 1 2 x m if x < x m . Therefore, partner A's ex ante expected payoff is
Obviously,
Since ∆ CCM B decreases in x m , the information rent depends on the distribution of X.
Corollary 3. In CCM with the uninformed partner as the proposer, Partner A always benefits from an informational rent. The information rent is relatively small if the distribution of X is fat-tailed.
However, when the informed partner, partner A, is the proposer, the equilibrium outcome is drastically different. Now partner B has to decide whether he would like to buy or sell given any price proposed by partner A. ] , and this destroys the optimality of the assumed pure strategy. Similar arguments apply to any arbitrary price that can be proposed by partner A. Furthermore, given any price p, it is optimal for partner B to randomize equally between buying and selling.
Given any price p quoted by partner A, suppose partner B randomizes between "buy"
and "sell" with probability (q, 1 − q), with q > 1 2 . Since he will sell his shares with a higher probability, it is optimal for partner A to propose the maximal pricex. Given price p =x, partner B would like to sell with probability 1 instead of mixing between buying and selling, since almost for sure the value of the asset is lower. This destroys the optimality of q > 1 2 . A similar argument rules out q < 1 2 in equilibrium. Therefore, partner B's best strategy is to randomize equally between buying and selling.
Proposition 7. If the informed partner, partner A, is the proposer, his weakly dominant strategy is to propose a price equal to his true signal, ie p = x. The uninformed partner, partner B, randomizes equally between buying and selling.
Proof. We have already established that partner B randomizes equally between buying and selling given any price p. Now it is trivial to show that proposing a price equal to his true signal is a weakly dominant strategy for partner A. Partner A chooses price p to maximize his expected payoff
which is independent of the price he quotes. Therefore, proposing a price equal to his true signal is a weakly dominant strategy.
Obviously, the outcome of Proposition 7 is that each partner becomes the single owner of the asset with equal probability. Therefore, expected payoffs of the two partners must be equal to a half of the expected value of the asset: 
Discussions
If the partnership to be dissolved has a common value, ex post ownership allocation efficiency is not a concern, since no matter which party becomes the single owner, the value of the asset is always maximized. However, there is another dimension of efficiency issue if the partners race in costly information acquisition in order to be at a better position in the subsequent dissolution game. In this subsection, we first compare the three institutions on the basis of the information rent they generate for the informed parter assuming that information structure is exogenously given, and then discuss the case of endogenous information.
Exogenous information
The information structure modeled in this paper may arise exogenously and naturally from the management of the assets. For example, one partner has been actively involved in the management of the asset and thus has learned about its value in operation, while the other partner has been a sleeping partner, currently only shares profits earned on the jointly owned asset, and needs to get adapted at a negligible cost in case he becomes the single owner. Another example is a joint venture between venture capitalist and an entrepreneur where the entrepreneur has more knowledge about the future of the project due to his expertise.
If the information structure is exogenously given and the partners have no channel of additional information acquisition, one can rank the three institutions according to the information rent they bring to the informed partner. Use CCM i to denote the cake cutting mechanism when partner i ∈ {A, B} is the proposer. Proof. Since CCM A does not bring any information rent, WBA and LBA are "payoff equivalent", we only need to compare the information rent from CCM B and WBA.
Recall that the information rent from WBA is given by:
which is a constant with respect to x m . The information rent from CCM B is given by:
and is bigger than ∆ W BA . When x m is close tox, ∆ CCM B is close to 0 and thus smaller than ∆ W BA . Definex as the unique solution to Proposition 9 also tells us partner A's preference order over the three different institutions. The uninformed partner's preference is exactly reversed. For fairness considerations, one has the concern whether information shall be rewarded or not. If not, CCM A is the perfect mechanism if it is verifiable who has proprietary information.
However, if that information is not verifiable, informed partner can not be forced to be the proposer. In that case, CCM may perform worse than WBA and LBA in case the uninformed happens to be the proposer.
Costly Information Acquisition
Different from the case of exogenous information structure, partners ex ante may be symmetric in their knowledge about the asset value. However, after reaching agreement upon dissolution and the rule to be used in dissolving the partnership, (in case of CCM, a proposer is also selected,) the partners may engage in costly information acquisition activities in order to be at a better position in the subsequent dissolution game. Suppose getting the right signal incurs a fixed cost c. Whether one partner has acquired the information or not is observable to the other partner, though not necessarily verifiable.
If no partner holds any private information or both know exactly the value of the asset, the three institutions, WBA, LBA, and CCM, lead to the identical outcome of a fair lottery. In all these games, the bidding strategy is to bid the (expected) asset value, and each partner ends up with a wealth level equal to a half of the asset value.
Under WBA and LBA, due to the information rent one obtains if he has proprietary information and the loss one expects if the other partner has proprietary information, both players may have an incentive to acquire information. Recall that the information rent under these two rules are given identically by
If c > ∆ 2 , the information rent one can obtain due to advantageous information is not sufficient to cover the cost of information acquisition. Thus no partner engages in information acquisition in equilibrium. If c is lower than ∆ 2 , the two partners are in a situation of prisoner's dilemma. Both would be better off if no one acquires information than if both acquire information. However, given the other partner not acquiring information, it is optimal for one partner to acquire information. In equilibrium, both partners spend c to learn the value of the asset, and in consequence share the asset value equally. Although the division is always fair in the sense that each partner receives a wealth equal to half of asset value, there is socially wasteful activity in information acquisition.
If CCM is the division rule, recall that in a dissolution subgame a proposer can not make use of his proprietary information but a chooser can, and the chooser gets an information rent equal to
If the chooser does not acquire information, the proposer finds it optimal not to acquire information. However, given that the proposer not acquiring information, the chooser finds it optimal to acquire information. Therefore, partners must randomize in their choice of whether to acquire information or not. In equilibrium each partner acquires information with strict positive probability.
Proposition 10. All the three dissolution rules involve socially wasteful information acquisition.
Under such cases, although there is no efficiency issue involved in the assignment of ownership, social waste is created when the partners try to get proprietary information in order to be at a better position in the subsequent dissolution game. In such a case, the best rule is to delegate the authority of division to a neutral third party who can purchase the signal and determine a fair price, then the waste in information acquisition can be partially eliminated.
Conclusions
In dissolving a common-value partnership where one partner holds proprietary information, simple mechanisms that dissolve a partnership have very different properties in comparison to situations where no such proprietary information exists. The paper analyzes the winner's bid auction (WBA), the loser's bid auction (LBA), and the cake cutting mechanisms (CCM) under such information framework. In WBA and LBA, the unique equilibrium is mixed strategy equilibrium. The informed partner receives an information rent and the uninformed partner suffers from a loss. WBA and LBA are "payoff equivalent" as the partners receive the same expected payoffs under the two auction formats. When CCM is applied, whether pure strategy equilibrium exists or not depends on who is the proposer. If the informed partner is the proposer, only mixed strategy equilibrium exists where the informed partner fully reveals his information, however, this depends critically on the assumption that the party who holds proprietary information is verifiable to the court. When information structure is endogenized, all the three rules lead to social waste in costly information acquisition.
We still need to determine the boundary conditions. We will first show that partner B's action space must be [β(0), β(x)]. Given that partner A chooses his bid from [0,b], partner B does not have any incentive to choose an action outside that interval. Suppose β(x) + is also in his action set. That is strictly dominated by bidding β(x) at which he wins almost for sure but pays a lower price conditional on winning. Suppose there exists a small interval [β(0), β(0) + ] that is not a part of partner B's randomization strategy. Then partner A by placing a bid below β(0) + loses for sure. Then there must exists a small interval below β(0) + such that partner A would like to increase his bid to win with some positive probability, hence violating that assumption that β(·)
is the equilibrium.
We still need to show that β(0) = 0 and β(x) <x. Given partner B's bid, when x = 0, suppose partner A proposes a strictly positive price. Then he wins the auction with a positive probability, in which case he gets the firm and pays half of his bid to partner B. This is strictly dominated by bidding zero and always ensuring himself a nonnegative payoff. Therefore, b(0) = 0. When x =x, partner A does not propose any price abovex because doing so is strictly dominated by proposing a price equal tox. In both cases partner A wins the auction with probability close 1 but the latter leads to a smaller payment. By bidding a price equal tox partner A wins for sure but paysx/2 for partner B's share. By slightly decreasing his bid, he still wins almost for sure but makes a smaller payment when he wins. Thus, b(x) =b <x.
